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Spectrum Access for Cognitive Radio Networks
Stefano Iellamo Lin Chen Marceau Coupechoux
Abstract
In this paper, we tackle the problem of opportunistic spectrum access in large-scale cognitive radio networks,
where the unlicensed Secondary Users (SU) access the frequency channels partially occupied by the licensed
Primary Users (PU). Each channel is characterized by an availability probability unknown to the SUs. We apply
evolutionary game theory to model the spectrum access problem and develop distributed spectrum access policies
based on imitation, a behavior rule widely applied in human societies consisting of imitating successful behavior.
We first develop two imitation-based spectrum access policies based on the basic Proportional Imitation (PI) rule
and the more advanced Double Imitation (DI) rule given that a SU can imitate any other SUs. We then adapt the
proposed policies to a more practical scenario where a SU can only imitate the other SUs operating on the same
channel. A systematic theoretical analysis is presented for both scenarios on the induced imitation dynamics and the
convergence properties of the proposed policies to an imitation-stable equilibrium, which is also the ǫ-optimum of
the system. Simple, natural and incentive-compatible, the proposed imitation-based spectrum access policies can be
implemented distributedly based on solely local interactions and thus is especially suited in decentralized adaptive
learning environments as cognitive radio networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio [1], with its capability to flexibly configure its transmission parameters, has emerged
in recent years as a promising paradigm to enable more efficient spectrum utilization. Spectrum access
models in cognitive radio networks can be classified into three categories, namely exclusive use (or operator
sharing), commons and shared use of primary licensed spectrum [2]. In the last model, unlicensed secondary
users (SU) are allowed to access the spectrum of licensed primary users (PU) in an opportunistic way. In
this case, a well-designed spectrum access mechanism is crucial to achieve efficient spectrum usage.
In this paper, we focus on the generic model of cognitive networks consisting of multiple frequency
channels, each characterized by a channel availability probability determined by the activity of PUs on it.
In such model, from the individual SU’s perspective, a challenging problem is to compete (or coordinate)
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2with other SUs in order to opportunistically access the unused spectrum of PUs to maximize its own
payoff (e.g., throughput); at the system level, a crucial research issue is to design efficient spectrum access
protocols achieving optimal spectrum usage.
We tackle the spectrum access problem in large-scale cognitive radio networks from an evolutionary
game theoretic angle. We formulate the spectrum access problem as a non-cooperative game and develop
distributed spectrum access policies based on imitation, a behavior rule widely applied in human societies
consisting of imitating successful behavior. We establish the convergence of the proposed policies to an
imitation-stable equilibrium which is also the ǫ-optimum of the system. Simple, natural and incentive-
compatible mechanism, the proposed spectrum access policies can be implemented distributedly based on
solely local interactions and thus is especially suited in decentralized adaptive learning environments as
cognitive radio networks.
The motivation of applying evolutionary game theory and imitation-based strategy in the study of the
spectrum access problem is tri-fold.
• First, evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool to study the interaction among players and the
system dynamic in terms of population. Stemmed from classic game theory and Darwin’s evolution
theory, it can explicitly capture the fundamental relationship among competition, cooperation and
communication, three crucial elements in the design of any spectrum access protocols in cognitive
radio networks.
• Second, compared with replicator dynamic, the most explored evolutionary model which mimics the
effect of natural selection, imitation dynamic captures the spreading of successful strategies through
imitation rather than inheritance, which is more adapted in games played by autonomous decision
makers as in our case.
• Third, evolutionary game theory, especially imitation dynamic which relies solely on local interactions,
provides a theoretic tool for the design of distributed channel access protocols based on local
information which is particularly suited in decentralized environments as cognitive radio networks.
In our analysis, we start by developing the imitation-based spectrum access policies where a SU can
imitate any other SUs. More specifically, we develop two spectrum access policies based on the following
two imitation rules:
• the Proportional Imitation (PI) rule where a SU can sample one other SU;
• the more advanced adjusted proportional imitation rule with double sampling (Double Imitation, DI)
where a SU can sample two other SUs.
Under both imitation rules, each SU strives to improve its individual payoff by imitating other SUs with
higher payoff. We then adapt the proposed spectrum access policies to a more practical scenario where
a SU can only imitate the other SUs operating on the same channel. A systematic theoretical analysis
3is presented for both scenarios on the induced imitation dynamics and the convergence properties of the
proposed policies to an imitation-stable equilibrium, which is also the ǫ-optimum of the system.
The key contribution of our work in this paper lies in the systematical application of the natural imitation
behavior to address the spectrum access problem in cognitive radio networks, the design of a distributed
imitation-based channel access policy, and the theoretic analysis on the induced imitation dynamic and
the convergence to an efficient and stable system equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the system model followed by the
formulation of the spectrum access game. Section III describes the proposed imitation-based spectrum
access policies in the scenario where a SU can imitate any other SUs. In Section IV, we adapt the
proposed policies to the scenario where a SU can only imitate the other SUs operating on the same
channel. Section V presents simulation results on the performance of the proposed policies. Section VI
discusses related work in the literature. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SPECTRUM ACCESS GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we present the system model of our work with the notations used, followed by the
game formulation of the spectrum access problem, which serves as the basis of the analysis in subsequent
sections.
A. System Model
We consider a primary network consisting of a set C of C frequency channels, each with bandwidth B1.
The users in the primary network are operated in a synchronous time-slotted fashion. A set N of N SUs
tries to opportunistically access the channels when they are left free by PUs. Let Zi(k) be the random
variable equal to 1 when of channel i is unoccupied by any PU at slot k and 0 otherwise. We assume that
the process {Zi(k)} is stationary and independent for each i and k. We also assume that at each time slot,
channel i is free with probability µi, i.e., E[Zi(k)] = µi. The channel availability probabilities µ , {µi}
are a priori not known by SUs. We assume perfect sensing at the SUs, i.e., any transmission of any PU
on a channel is perfectly sensed by SUs sensing that channel and thus no collision occurs between PUs
and SUs.
In our work, each SU j is modelled as a rational decision maker, striking to maximize the throughput
it can achieve, denoted as Tj , which can be expressed as a function of µi and nsj , where sj denotes the
channel which j chooses, nsj denotes the number of SUs on channel sj . More formally, the expected
value of Tj can be written as:
E[Tj ] = f(µi, nsj).
1Our analysis can be extended to study the heterogeneous case with different channel capacities.
4In order to perform a closed-form analysis, we focus on the scenario where the channel capacity is evenly
shared among all SUs on the channel when it is free, i.e.,
E[Tj ] = f(µsj , nsj) = Bµsj/nsj .
It should be noted that f(µsj , nsj) depends on the MAC protocol implemented at the cognitive users.
Beside the evenly shared model considered in this paper, several other models are also largely applied in
practice such as the CSMA-based random access model. Our work in this paper can be adapted in those
cases by defining appropriate function f .
B. Spectrum Access Game Formulation
To study the interactions among autonomous selfish SUs and to derive distributed channel access policies,
we formulate the channel selection problem as a spectrum access game where the players are the SUs.
Each player j stays on a channel i to opportunistically exploit the unused spectrum of PUs to maximize
its expected throughput. The game is defined formally as follows:
Definition 1. The spectrum access game G is a 3-tuple (N , C, {Uj}), where N is the player set, C is the
strategy set of each player. Each player j chooses its strategy sj ∈ C to maximize its normalized utility
function Uj defined as
Uj = E[Tj ]/B = µsj/nsj .
The solution of the spectrum access game G is characterized by a Nash Equilibrium (NE) [3], a strategy
profile from which no player has incentive to deviate unilaterally. Using the related theory on congestion
games, we can establish the existence and the uniqueness of the NE in the spectrum access game G for
the asymptotic case (N →∞) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In the asymptotic case where N is large, G admits a unique NE. At the NE, there are x∗iN
SUs staying with channel i, where x∗i = µi∑
l∈C µl
.
Proof: Given the form of SUs’ utility function, it follows from in [4] that the spectrum access game
is a congestion game. Moreover, in the asymptotic case approximating the game G by a game with a
continuous set of users, denote x , {xi, i ∈ C} where xi denotes the proportion of SUs choosing channel
i, we can write the potential function of the congestion game as follows:
P (x) ,
∑
i∈C
∫ xiN
ǫ0
µi
t
dt,
where ǫ0 > 0 is a small constant introduced to avoid the non-integral point of µi/t at 0. We can verify
that for a SU j staying on channel i, it holds that :
∂P (x)
∂xi
= E[Uj(µi, xiN)].
5To derive the NE of G, we seek the maximum of P (x). To this end, we develop P (x) as
P (x) =
∑
i∈C
µi
N
(log xi − log ǫ0).
To find the maximum of P (x), we solve the following optimization problem
max
x
P (x) s.t.
∑
i∈C
xi = 1 and xi > 0, ∀i ∈ C,
which has a unique solution because the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient as P (x) is concave
and the constraint is linear. After some straightforward algebraic operations, we can find the unique
maximum x∗ , {x∗i } as follows:
x∗i =
µi∑
l∈C µl
∀i ∈ C.
The maximum x∗ is also the unique NE of G.
We can observe two desirable properties of the unique NE derived in Theorem 1:
• the NE is optimal from the system perspective as the total throughput of the network achieves its
optimum at the NE;
• the NE ensures that the spectrum resource is shared fairly among SUs.
One critical challenge in the analyzed spectrum access game is the design of distributed spectrum access
strategies for rational SUs to converge to the NE without the a priori knowledge of µ. In response to
this challenge, we develop in the sequel sections of this paper an efficient spectrum access policy. Our
proposed policy can be implemented distributedly based on solely local interactions without any knowledge
on the channel statistics and thus is especially suited in decentralized adaptive learning environments as
cognitive radio networks. In terms of performance, we demonstrate both analytically and numerically that
the proposed channel access policy converges to the ǫ-NE2 of G which is also the ǫ-optimum of the system.
III. IMITATION-BASED SPECTRUM ACCESS POLICIES
The spectrum access policy we develop is based on imitation. As a behavior rule widely observed in
human societies, imitation captures the behavior of a rational player that mimics the actions of other
players with higher payoff in order to improve its own payoff. The induced imitation dynamic models the
spreading of successful strategies under imitation [5]. In this section, we focus on the scenario where a SU
can imitate any other SUs and develop two spectrum access policies based on the proportional imitation
rule and the double imitation rule. We analyze the induced dynamic of the imitation process and show
the convergence of the proposed policy to the ǫ-NE of G. In the next section, we extend our efforts to a
more practical scenario where a SU can only imitate the other SUs operating on the same channel and
develop an adapted imitation-based spectrum access policy in the new context.
2A strategy profile is an ǫ-NE if no player can gain more than ǫ in payoff by unilaterally deviating from his strategy.
6A. Spectrum Access Policy Based on Proportional Imitation
Algorithm 1 presents our proposed spectrum access policy based on the proportional imitation rule,
termed as PISAP. The core idea is: at each iteration, each SU randomly selects another SU in the network;
if the payoff of the selected SU is higher than its own payoff, the SU imitates the strategy of the selected
SU at the next iteration with a probability proportional to the payoff difference, coefficiented by the
imitation factor σ.3
We first study the dynamic induced by PISAP by setting ǫU = 0. It is shown in [6] that in the asymptotic
case, the proportional imitation rule in Algorithm 1 generates a population dynamic described by the
following set of differential equations:
x˙i(t) = σxi(t)[πi(t)− π(t)] i ∈ C, (1)
where πi denotes the expected payoff of the SUs on channel i, π ,
∑
i∈C xiπi denotes the expected payoff
of all SUs in the network. Injecting πi = µi/(xiN) into the differential equations, (1) becomes:
x˙i(t)
σ
=
µi
N
− xi(t)
∑
l∈C
µl
N
.
This equation can be easily solved as:
xi(t) = Kie
−(
∑
l∈C
µl
N )σt +
µi∑
l∈C µl
, (2)
where the constant Ki = xi(0)− µi∑
l∈C µl
.
As the first result of this section, the following theorem states the convergence of the dynamic to the
NE of the spectrum access game G.
Theorem 2. The imitation dynamic induced by PISAP converges exponentially to an evolutionary equi-
librium which is also the NE of G.
Proof: The theorem follows straightforwardly from (2) and Theorem 1.
As an illustrative example, Figure 1 (obtained with [7]) shows the convergence of the imitation dynamic
of PISAP to the NE of G for a cognitive network of 2 channels and 50 SUs.
We then study the convergence of PISAP in the general case with ǫU > 0. Specifically, we define the
imitation-stable equilibrium as a state where no further imitations can be conducted based on the imitation
policy [8]. The following theorem analyzes the convergence of PISAP with respect to this concept.
Theorem 3. PISAP converges to an imitation-stable equilibrium in expected O( N2
µminσǫU
) iterations where
µmin , mini∈C µi. The converged equilibrium is an ǫ-NE of G with ǫ = 2ǫU .
Proof: We provide the sketch of the proof here. The detailed proof is provided in the Appendix.
We first prove the convergence of PISAP to an imitation-stable equilibrium. Define imax , argmaxi∈C πi(t)
3One way of setting σ is to set σ = 1/(ω − α), where ω and α are two exogenous parameters such that Uj ∈ [α, ω],∀j ∈ C.
7and imin , argmini∈C πi(t), we show that for each iteration t, if πimax(t) − πimin(t) > ǫU , then at least
one of the following holds πimin(t+ 1)− πimin(t) ∼ O(
µminσǫU
N2
)
πimax(t)− πimax(t+ 1) ∼ O(
µmaxσǫU
N2
)
.
I.e., if the difference between the highest expected individual payoff πimax(t) and the worst one πimin(t) is
larger than ǫU , we can at least increase πimin(t) by O(µminσǫUN2 ) or decrease πimax(t) by O(
µmaxσǫU
N2
).
It follows that after a finite number of iterations (the exact form is deduced in the detailed proof),
PISAP converges to a state where πimax(t) − πimin(t) ≤ ǫU , which is imitation-stable. We then show
by contradiction that the converged imitation-stable equilibrium is an ǫ-Nash of G with ǫ = 2ǫU .
Note that the convergence delay O( N2
µminσǫU
) derived in Theorem 3 consists of the upper bound and
through the simulations we conduct, we observe that the convergence is achieved in a much shorter delay.
B. Spectrum Access Policy Based on Double Imitation
In this subsection, we turn to a more advanced imitation rule, the double imitation rule [9] and propose
the DI-based spectrum access policy, termed as DISAP. Under DISAP, each SU randomly samples two
SUs and imitates them with a certain probability determined by the utility difference. The spectrum access
policy based on the double imitation is detailed in Algorithm 2, in which each SUs randomly samples
two other SUs j1 and j2 (without loss of generality, assume that j1 and j2 operate on channel i1 and i2
respectively, with corresponding utilities Uj1 ≤ Uj2) and updates the probabilities of switching to channels
i1 and i2, denoted as pj1 and pj2 respectively.
The double imitation rule generates an aggregate monotone dynamic [9], [10], which is defined as
follows:
x˙i =
xi
ω − α
[
1 +
ω − π
ω − α
]
(πi − π) ∀i ∈ C (3)
Injecting πi = µi/(xiN) into the differential equations, we have:
x˙i =
σπ
ω − α
(
1 +
ω − π
ω − α
)
−
σπ
ω − α
(
1 +
ω − π
ω − α
)
xi,
whose solution is
xi(t) = Ke
− σπ
ω−α(1+
ω−π
ω−α)t +
µi∑
l∈C µl
, (4)
where π =
∑
l∈C µl/N and K = xi(0)−
µi∑
l∈C µl
. In the studied scenario, α and ω are the lower and upper
bound of the SUs’ utility, which are 0 and 1, respectively.
The following theorem stating the major result in this subsection follows immediately.
Theorem 4. DISAP converges exponentially to the NE of the spectrum access game G.
Compared with the proportional imitation rule, which produces the replicator dynamic (Eq. (1)), the
adjusted proportional imitation rule induces the aggregate monotone dynamic (Eq. (3)) that converges to
8the NE at a higher rate. In Fig. 1 is shown the phase plane for replicator dynamics and aggregate monotone
dynamics. As proven in Theorem 1 for large N there exists only one attractor (NE), which is the crossing
point of the two nulclines (dashed lines).
We then study the convergence to an imitation-stable equilibrium of DISAP in the general case with
ǫU > 0 in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. DISAP converges to an imitation-stable equilibrium in expected O( N2
µminσǫU
) iterations where
µmin , mini∈C µi. The converged equilibrium is an ǫ-NE of G with ǫ = 2ǫU .
Proof: The proof follows the same analysis as that of Theorem 3. The detail is provided in the
Appendix.
C. Discussion
As desirable properties, the proposed imitation-based spectrum access policies (both PISAP and DISAP)
are stateless, incentive-compatible for selfish autonomous SUs and requires no central computational unit.
The spectrum assignment is achieved by local interactions among autonomous SUs and the ǫ-optimum
of the system is achieved when the algorithm converges, which is achieved in polynomial time. The
autonomous behavior and decentralized implementation make the proposed policies especially suitable for
large scale cognitive radio networks. The imitation factor σ controls the tradeoff between the convergence
speed and the channel switching frequency in that larger σ represents more aggressiveness in imitation
and thus leads to fast convergence, at the price of more frequent channel switching for the SUs which
may consist of significant cost for today’s wireless devices in terms of delay, packet loss and protocol
overhead. The imitation threshold ǫU , on the other hand, can be tuned to balance between the convergence
speed and the optimality of the converged equilibrium.
IV. IMITATION ON THE SAME CHANNEL
Up to now, we have studied the imitation-based channel access policy where a SU can imitate any other
SU whatever the channel the latter stays in. This approach implicitly assumes that a SU can interact with
SUs on different channels, which may not be realistic in some cases or pose additional system overhead
(e.g., sensing a different channel). In this section, we focus on a more practical scenario, where a SU
only imitates the SUs on the same channel and the imitation is based on the payoff difference of the
precedent iteration. In the considered scenario, a SU only needs to locally interact with the SUs on the
same channel (e.g., exchange payoff of the precedent iteration, which can be piggybacked with the data
packets transmitted on the channel).
In the sequel analysis, we first study the induced imitation dynamic and the convergence of the proposed
spectrum access policies PISAP and DISAP subject to channel constraint on imitation.
9A. Imitation Dynamic and Convergence
In this subsection, we first derive in Theorem 6 the dynamic for a generic imitation rule F with
large population. We then derive in Lemma 1, Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 the dynamic of the proposed
proportional imitation policy PISAP and its convergence under the channel constraint. The counterpart
analysis for the double imitation policy DISAP is explored in Lemma 2, Theorem 9 and Theorem 10.
We start by introducing the notations used in our analysis. At an iteration, we label all SUs performing
strategy i (channel i in our case) as SUs of type i and we refer to the SUs on sj as neighbors of SU j.
We denote nli(t) the number of SUs on channel i at iteration t and operating on channel l at t − 1. It
holds that
∑
l∈C n
l
i(t) = ni(t) and
∑
i∈C n
l
i(t) = nl(t − 1). For a given state s(t) , {sj(t), j ∈ C} at
iteration t and a finite population of size N , we denote pi(t) , ni(t)/N the proportion of SUs of type i
and pli(t) , nli(t)/N the proportion of SUs migrating from channel l to i. We use x instead of p to denote
these proportions in asymptotic case. It holds that p→ x when N → +∞.
In our study, a generic imitation rule under the channel constraint is termed as F . In the case of the
proportional imitation rule (c.f. PISAP), F is characterized by the probability set {F ij,k} where F ij,k denotes
the probability that a SU choosing strategy j at the precedent iteration imitates another SU choosing strategy
k at the precedent iteration and then switches to channel i at next iteration after imitation. Instead, by
applying the double imitation rule (c.f. DISAP), we can characterize F by the probability set {F ij,{k,l}}
where F ij,{k,l} denotes the probability that a SU choosing strategy j at the precedent iteration imitates two
neighbors choosing respectively strategy k and strategy l at the precedent iteration and then switches to
channel i at next iteration after imitation. In both cases the only way to switch to a channel i is to imitate
a SU that was on channel i. That means F ij,k = 0, ∀k 6= i (PISAP) and F ij,{k,l} = 0, ∀k, l 6= i (DISAP).
At the initialization phase (iteration 0 and 1), each SU randomly chooses its strategy. After that, the system
state at iteration t + 1, denoted as p(t+ 1) (x(t+ 1) in the asymptotic case), depends on the states at
iteration t and t− 1.
Theorem 6. For any imitation rule F , if the imitation among SUs of the same type occurs randomly
and independently, then ∀δ > 0, ǫ > 0 and any initial state {x˜i(0)}, {x˜i(1)}, there exists N0 ∈ N
such that if N > N0, ∀i ∈ C, the event |pi(t) − xi(t)| > δ occurs with probability less than ǫ, where
pi(0) = xi(0) = x˜i(0), pi(1) = xi(1) = x˜i(1). In the case of proportional imitation policy it holds that
xi(t + 1) =
∑
j,l,k∈C
xlj(t)x
k
j (t)
xj(t)
F il,k ∀i ∈ C
Differently, the double imitation policy yields:
xi(t+ 1) =
∑
j,l,k,z∈C
xlj(t)x
k
j (t)x
z
j (t)
[xj(t)]2
F il,{k,z} ∀i ∈ C
Proof: The proof consists of first showing the theorem holds for iteration t = 2 and then proving the
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case t ≥ 3 by induction. The detail is in Appendix.
Theorem 6 is an important result on the short run adjustments of large populations under any generic
imitation rule F : the probability that the behavior of a large population differs from the one of an infinite
population is arbitrarily small when N is sufficiently large. In what follows, we study the convergence of
PISAP and DISAP under the channel constraint.
(1) Spectrum access policy PISAP under channel constraint
We now focus on PISAP under channel constraint and derive the induced imitation dynamic by setting
ǫU = 0 in the following analysis.
Lemma 1. On the proportional imitation policy PISAP under channel constraint, it holds that
xji (t+ 1) =
∑
l,k∈C
xlj(t)x
k
j (t)
xj(t)
F il,k ∀i, j ∈ C. (5)
Proof: The proof is straightforward from the analysis in the proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. The proportional imitation policy PISAP under channel constraint generates the following
dynamic in the asymptotic case
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t− 1) + σπi(t− 1)xi(t− 1)− σ
∑
j,l∈C
πl(t− 1)
xij(t)x
l
j(t)
xj(t)
(6)
where πi(t) denotes the expected payoff of an individual SU on channel i at iteration t.
Proof: It can be shown that the proportional imitation policy PISAP under channel constraint is both
imitating4 and improving5. Apply the analysis in [5] (Eq. (10)) to our case, we can characterize {F il,k} for
the proportional imitation rule under channel constraint as:
F il,k =
0 k 6= iF li,l + σ[πi(t− 1)− πl(t− 1)] k = i .
In other words, the only possibility to switch to channel i is to imitate a SU that was on channel i; the
switching probability is proportional to the payoff difference. Noticing that
∑
l x
l
j(t)F
l
i,l/xj(t) = 1, (5)
can be written as follows:
xji (t+ 1) =
∑
l∈C
xlj(t)x
i
j(t)
xj(t)
F il,i =
∑
l∈C
xlj(t)x
i
j(t)
xj(t)
F li,l +
∑
l∈C
xlj(t)x
i
j(t)
xj(t)
σ[πi(t− 1)− πl(t− 1)]
= xij(t) +
∑
l∈C
xlj(t)x
i
j(t)
xj(t)
σ[πi(t− 1)− πl(t− 1)].
Injecting ∑j xij(t) = xi(t−1), ∑l xlj(t)/xj(t) = 1 and xi(t+1) =∑j xji (t+1) into the above formula,
we can obtain (6), which concludes the proof.
4A behavior rule is imitating if the switching actions of the rule occur by imitating the sampled individual.
5A behavior rule is improving if and only the expected payoff of an individual increases after imitation.
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We observe via extensive numerical experiments that (6) always converges to an evolutionary equilib-
rium. To get more in-depth insight on the dynamic (6), we notice that under the following approximation:∑
l∈C
πl(t− 1)
xlj(t)
xj(t)
≈ π¯(t− 1), (7)
where π¯(t−1) is the average individual payoff for the whole system at iteration t−1, noticing
∑
j x
i
j(t) =
xi(t− 1), (6) can be written as:
xi(t + 1) = xi(t− 1) + σxi(t− 1)[πi(t− 1)− π¯(t− 1)]. (8)
Note that the approximation (7) states that in any channel j at iteration t, the proportions of SUs coming
from any channel l are representative of the whole population.
Under the approximation (7), given the initial state {xi(0)}, {xi(1)}, we can decompose (8) into the
following two independent discrete-time replicator dynamics:xi(u) = xi(u− 1) + σxi(u− 1)[πi(u− 1)− π¯(u− 1)]xi(v) = xi(v − 1) + σxi(v − 1)[πi(v − 1)− π¯(v − 1)] (9)
where u = 2t, v = 2t + 1. The two equations in (9) illustrate the underlying system dynamic hinged
behind the proportional imitation policy under channel constraint under the approximation (7): it can be
decomposed into two independent delayed replicator dynamics that alternatively occur at the odd and even
iterations, respectively. The following theorem establishes the convergence of (9) to a unique fixed point
which is also the NE of the spectrum access game G.
Theorem 8. Starting from any initial point, the system described by (9) converges to a unique fixed point
which is also the NE of the spectrum access game G.
Proof: The proof, of which the detail is provided in the Appendix, consists of showing that the
mapping described by (9) is a contraction mapping.
As an illustrative example, Figure 2 shows that the double replicator dynamic provides an accurate
approximation of the system dynamic induced by PISAP under channel constraint.
Furthermore, performing the same analysis as that of Theorem 3, we can establish the same convergence
property on the imitation algorithm under channel constraint under the approximation (7) for the general
case with ǫU ≥ 0.
(2) Spectrum access policy DISAP under channel constraint
We then focus on DISAP under channel constraint and derive the induced imitation dynamic.
Lemma 2. On the double imitation policy DISAP under channel constraint, it holds that
xji (t + 1) =
∑
l,k,z∈C
xlj(t)x
k
j (t)x
z
j (t)
[xj(t)]2
F il,{k,z} ∀i, j ∈ C. (10)
12
Proof: The proof is straightforward from the analysis in the proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem 9. The double imitation policy DISAP under channel constraint generates the following dynamic
in the asymptotic case
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t− 1) + 2xi(t− 1)πi(t− 1) +
∑
j
xij(t)
[∑
k
xkj (t)
xj(t)
]2
− 2xij(t)
∑
k
xkj (t)
xj(t)
πk(t− 1)
− xij(t)πi(t− 1)
∑
k
xkj (t)
xj(t)
πk(t− 1) (11)
where πi(t) denotes the expected payoff of an individual SU on channel i at iteration t.
Proof: If the rule F is unbiased6, it follows from [9] that F is also improving and globally efficient7.
We can than characterize {F il,k} as in [9] (Theorem 1):
F il,{k,i} = F
k
i,{l,k} + F
l
i,{k,l} − F
i
k,{l,i} −
1
2
σ(πk)(πl − πi)−
1
2
σ(πl)(πk − πi)
In other words, the only possibility to switch to channel i is to imitate a SU that was on channel i.
Setting ω = 1 and α = 0, so that σ(y) = 2 − y, and noticing that
∑
l,k x
l
j(t)x
k
j (t)F
i
k,{l,i}/xj(t)
2 = 1, (5)
can be written as follows:
xji (t+ 1) = x
i
j(t) + x
i
j(t)
(
2−
∑
k
xkj (t)πk(t− 1)
xj
)(
πi(t− 1)−
∑
k
xkjπk(t− 1)
xj
)
Injecting ∑j xij(t) = xi(t−1), ∑l xlj(t)/xj(t) = 1 and xi(t+1) =∑j xji (t+1) into the above formula,
we can obtain (11), which concludes the proof.
We observe via extensive numerical experiments that (11) always converges to an evolutionary equilib-
rium and, as shown in Fig, 6, also features a smoother and faster convergence trend with respect to the
proportional imitation dynamic (Eq. (6)).
By performing the same approximation as in (7), (11) can be written as:
xi(t + 1) = xi(t− 1) + xi(t− 1)(2− π¯(t− 1))(πi(t− 1)− π¯(t− 1)). (12)
Under the approximation (7), given the initial state {xi(0)}, {xi(1)}, we can decompose (12) into the
following two independent discrete-time aggregate monotone dynamics:xi(u) = xi(u− 1) + xi(u− 1)[2− π¯(u− 1)] · [πi(u− 1)− π¯(u− 1)]xi(v) = xi(v − 1) + xi(v − 1)[2− π¯(v − 1)] · [πi(v − 1)− π¯(v − 1)] (13)
where u = 2t, v = 2t+1. The above two equations illustrate the underlying system dynamic hinged behind
the double imitation policy under channel constraint under the approximation (7): it can be decomposed
into two independent delayed aggregate monotone dynamics that alternatively occur at the odd and even
6A behavioural rule is unbiased if it does not depend on the labelling of actions.
7A behavioural rule is globally efficient if, for any Multi-armed bandit, all individuals use a best action in the long run, provided that
initially each action is present.
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iterations, respectively. The following theorem establishes the convergence of (13) to a unique fixed point
which is also the NE of the spectrum access game G. The proof follows exactly the same analysis as that
of Theorem 8.
Theorem 10. Starting from any initial point, the system described by (13) converges to a unique fixed
point which is also the NE of the spectrum access game G.
As an illustrative example, Figure 3 shows that the double aggregate dynamic provides an accurate
approximation of the system dynamic induced by the double imitation under channel constraint.
B. Imitation-Based Channel Access Policy under Channel Constraint
In this subsection, based on the theoretic results derived previously, we develop a fully distributed
channel access policy for the general case with finite population based on the imitation rule among SUs
on the same channel (i.e. neighbors). The proposed policy, detailed in Algorithm 3, is suitable both for
proportional and double imitation. Run at each SU j and at each iteration, it consists of:
• sampling randomly one (proportional imitation) or two (double imitation) neighbors;
• comparing the payoff achieved at the previous iteration t − 1 with that of the neighbor(s) selected
for imitation;
• performing channel migration with the probability dictated by the applied imitation rule.
Algorithm 3 is evaluated by extensive simulations in next section.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed imitation-
based channel access policy (PISAP and DISAP) in both scenarios with and without channel constraints
and demonstrate some intrinsic properties of the policy which are not explicitly addressed in the analytical
part of the paper.
A. Simulation Settings
We simulate a cognitive radio network of N = 50 SUs and C = 3 channels, on which PUs has different
activity rates on different channels, leading to different channel availability probabilities characterized by
µ = [0.3, 0.5, 0.8]. We assume the iteration time to be long enough so that the SUs, regardless of the
occupied channel, can evaluate their payoff without errors.
B. System Dynamics
We first study the system dynamic induced by PISAP and DISAP in the scenarios with and without
channel constraint.
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As illustrated by Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, both (6) and (11), which reflect PISAP and DISAP behaviour in
the asymptotic case with channel constraint, produce trajectories that converge in a faster but less smooth
manner if compared with their respective unconstrained dynamics. This can be interpreted by the overlap
of two replicator/aggregate monotone dynamics at odd and even instants, as explained in section IV.
In Fig. 6 the trends of (6) and (11) are compared. We observe that, in the asymptotic case, DISAP
outperforms PISAP as it is characterized by less pronounced wavelets and a faster convergence. However,
all the displayed dynamics correctly converge to an evolutionary equilibrium. It is easy to check that the
converged equilibrium is also the NE of G and the system optimum, which confirms our theoretic analysis.
C. Convergence to Imitation-stable Equilibrium
We now study the convergence of PISAP and DISAP with and without channel constraint for a finite
number of users (N = 50). Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the number of SUs per channel during the convergence
phase for one realization of our algorithms without channel constraint. We notice that in both cases
convergence is rapidly achieved after few iterations, and that the channels with higher availabilities are
chosen by more individuals. This can be easily verified (Fig. 7 for PISAP and Fig. 8 for DISAP) by
observing that after convergence the major part of population settles permanently in channel 3, i.e. the
channel that less frequently hosts PU’s transmissions.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show that, starting from the same initial conditions, DISAP reaches an imitation-stable
equilibrium more rapidly than PISAP, at the price of a higher algorithmic complexity and a substantial
increase in information exchanges amongst the SUs due to double imitation. Note that the small deviation
of the trajectories at some iterations in the figures from the converged curve is due to the probabilistic
nature of the users’ strategy and has only very limited impact on the system as a whole.
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show instead a realization of our algorithms with channel constraint. We notice
that an imitation-stable equilibrium is achieved progressively following the dynamics characterized by (6)
and (11). The equilibrium is furthermore very close to the system optimum: we can in fact check that,
according to Theorem 1, the proportion of SUs choosing channel 1, 2 and 3 at the system optimum is
0.1875, 0.3125 and 0.5 respectively (see also Fig. 4 and Fig. 5); in the simulation results we observe that
there are 9, 16 and 25 SUs settling on channel 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
D. System Fairness
We now turn to the analysis of the fairness of the proposed spectrum access policies. To this end, we
adopt the Jain’s fairness index [11], which varies in [0, 1] and reaches its maximum when the resources are
equally shared amongst users. Fig. 13, whose curves represent an average over 103 independent realizations
of our algorithms, shows that our system turns out to be very fair even from the early iterations.
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From the same figures one can further infer that indeed DISAP converges more rapidly than PISAP: if
for instance we fix on the y-axis the fairness value 0.982, the latter is reached by DISAP at the iteration
t = 100, and by PISAP at the iteration t = 200.
VI. RELATED WORK
The spectrum access problem in the considered generic model (with single SU) is closely related to
the classic Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) problem [12]. In this case, a SU should strike a balance between
exploring the environment to find profitable channels (i.e., learn the channel availability probabilities)
and exploiting the best one using current knowledge. In this line of research, Gittins developed an index
policy in [13] that consists of selecting the arm with the highest index termed as Gittins index. This policy
is shown to be optimal in the most general case. Lai and Robbins [14] and then Agrawal [15] studied
the MAB problem by proposing policies based on the upper confidence bounds with logarithmic regret.
Compared with the classic MAB problem, one major specialty of the spectrum access in cognitive radio
networks lies in the fact of multiple SUs that can cause collisions if they simultaneously access the same
channel. Some recent work has investigated this issue, among which Anandkumar et al. proposed two
algorithms with logarithmic regret, where the number of SUs is known [16] and unknown and estimated
by each SU [17], Liu and Zhao developed a time-division fare share (TDFS) algorithm with convergence
and logarithmic regret [18].
As the spectrum access problem in cognitive radio is essentially a resource allocation problem, another
important thrust consists of applying game theory to model the competition and cooperation (coordination)
among SUs and the interaction between SUs and PUs. Along this line of research, a game theoretic
framework was developed in [19] to analyze the behavior of selfish users in cognitive radio networks,
resulting in distributed adaptive channel allocation algorithms based on the technique of no-regret learning.
In [20], the convergence of different types of games in cognitive radio systems was studied (i.e., coordinated
behavior, best response, best response for discounted repeated games, S-modular games and potential
games). A no-regret learning algorithm was proposed in [21] to address the channel allocation problem in
cognitive networks. The algorithm can reach a correlated equilibrium which, in many case, is more efficient
than the classic Nash equilibrium of the game. Maskery et al. considered the dynamic spectrum access
among cognitive radios from an adaptive, game theoretic learning perspective and proposed decentralized
dynamic spectrum access protocol [22]. Besides, due to the perceived fairness and allocation efficiency,
auction techniques have also attracted considerable research attention and resulted in a number of auction-
based spectrum allocation mechanisms (cf. [23] and references therein).
Due to the success of applying evolutionary game theory in the study of biological and economic
problems, a handful of recent studies have applied evolutionary game theory as a tool to study resource
16
allocation problems arisen from wired and wireless networks, among which Shakkottai et al. addressed
the problem of non-cooperative multi-homing of users to access points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs by
modeling it as a population game and studied the equilibrium properties of the game [24]; Niyato et
al. studied the dynamics of network selection in a heterogeneous wireless network using the theory of
evolutionary game and the replicator dynamic and proposed two network selection algorithm to reach
the evolutionary equilibrium [25]; Ackermann et al. investigated the concurrent imitation dynamics in
the context of symmetric congestion games by focusing on the convergence properties [8]; Niyato et al.
studied the multiple-seller and multiple-buyer spectrum trading game in cognitive radio networks using
the replicator dynamic and provided a theoretic analysis for the two-seller two-group-buyer case [26].
Coucheney et al. studied the user-network association problem in wireless networks with multi-technology
and proposed an algorithm to achieve the fair and efficient solution [27].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper, we address the spectrum access problem in cognitive radio networks by applying evolu-
tionary game theory and develop an imitation-based spectrum access policy. We investigate two imitation
scenarios where a SU can imitate any other SUs and where it can only imitate the other SUs operating on
the same channel. A systematic theoretical analysis is presented for both scenarios on the induced imitation
dynamics and the convergence properties of the proposed policy to an imitation-stable equilibrium, which
is also the ǫ-optimum of the system. As an important direction of the future work, we plan to investigate
the imitation-based channel access problem in the more generic multi-hop scenario where SUs can imitate
their neighbors and derive the relevant channel access/assignment policies there.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3:
We first prove the convergence of PISAP to an imitation-stable equilibrium.
Let imax , argmaxi∈C πi(t), imin , argmini∈C πi(t), we show that for any iteration t, if πimax(t) −
πimin(t) > ǫU , then at least one of the following holdsπi
min(t+ 1)− πimin(t) ∼ O(
µ
imin
σǫU
N2
)
πimax(t)− πimax(t+ 1) ∼ O(
µimaxσǫU
N2
)
.
I.e., if the difference between the highest expected individual payoff πimax(t) and the worst one πimin(t)
is larger than ǫU , we can at least increase πimin(t) by O(
µ
imin
σǫU
N2
) or decrease πimax(t) by O(µimaxσǫUN2 ).
Define the ǫU -worst channel set CǫU as the channel set such that a channel i ∈ CǫU iff πi − πimin ≤ ǫU
and π − πi > ǫU/2. In the same way, define the ǫU -best channel set CǫU as the channel set such that a
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channel i ∈ CǫU iff πimax − πi ≤ ǫU and πi − π > ǫU/2. At any iteration t, if πimax(t)− πimin(t) > ǫU , at
least one of CǫU and CǫU is not empty. Without loss of generality, assume that CǫU 6= ∅.
For any channel i ∈ CǫU (t), let xil(t + 1) denote the proportion of SUs migrating from channel i to l
after the imitation in the iteration t, i.e., the proportion of SUs operating on channel i at iteration t and
switching to channel l for iteration t+1. Given that the probability of imitating a SU in channel l is xl(t),
xil(t+ 1) can be computed as
xil(t+ 1) =
xi(t)xl(t)σ[πl(t)− πi(t)] l ∈ C − CǫU (t)0 l ∈ CǫU (t) .
Denote ∆xi(t) , xi(t + 1) − xi(t), it follows from the imitation rule that no SU migrates to channel
imin. Hence, ∆ximin(t) < 0 and
−E[∆ximin(t)] =
∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
E[xi
min
l (t+ 1)] = ximin(t)σ
 ∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)πl(t)−
∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)πimin(t)

= ximin(t)σ
∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)[πl(t)− πimin(t)].
Since CǫU (t) 6= ∅, there exists at least a channel l0 with πl0 − πimin > ǫU and xl0(t) ≥ 1/N . We have
− E[∆ximin(t)] > ximin(t)σxl0(t)[πl0(t)− πimin(t)] >
ximin(t)σǫU
N
. (14)
It then follows that
πimin(t+ 1)− πimin(t) =
µimin
Nximin(t+ 1)
−
µimin
Nximin(t)
=
1
N
[
µimin
ximin(t) + ∆ximin(t)
−
µimin
ximin(t)
]
>
µimin [−∆ximin(t)]
N [ximin(t)]2
>
µiminσǫU
N2ximin(t)
>
µiminσǫU
N2
Given that πi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ C and let µmin , mini∈C µi, it holds that after at most O( N
2
µminσǫU
) iterations,
PISAP converges to an imitation-stable equilibrium where πimax − πimin ≤ ǫU .
We then show by contradiction that the imitation-stable equilibrium is an ǫ-Nash of G with ǫ = 2ǫU .
Denote xi(∞) and πi(∞) the converged values of xi and πi in PISAP. Denote x∗ = {x∗i } the NE of
G. Recall that all payoffs at NE are equal: µi/Nx∗i is a constant. Assume now that there exists channel
i0 such that
|πi0(∞)− µi0/Nx
∗
i0
| > 2ǫU .
Without loss of generality, assume that
πi0(∞)− µi0/Nx
∗
i0
> 2ǫU .
We have now:
∀i ∈ C, πi(∞)− µi/Nx
∗
i = πi0(∞)− µi/Nx
∗
i + πi(∞)− πi0(∞)
= (πi0(∞)− µi0/Nx
∗
i0
) + (πi(∞)− πi0(∞))
> 2ǫU − |πimax − πimin |
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> 2ǫU − ǫU = ǫU .
This leads to xi(∞) < x∗i , ∀i ∈ C and
∑
i∈C xi(∞) = 1 <
∑
i∈C x
∗
i = 1, which is clearly a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5:
The proof follows the same analysis as that of Theorem 3. With the same notation in the proof of
Theorem 3, we first show that for each iteration t, if πimax(t) − πimin(t) > ǫU , then at least one of the
following holds πimin(t+ 1)− πimin(t) ∼ O(
µ
imin
σǫU
N2
)
πimax(t)− πimax(t+ 1) ∼ O(
µimaxσǫU
N2
)
.
Under the double imitation, xil(t + 1) can be computed as
xil(t+ 1) =
xi(t)xl(t)pl l ∈ C − CǫU (t)0 l ∈ CǫU (t) .
Injecting pl into the above formula, after some algebraic operations and following the same reasoning
as that in (14), we have
−E[∆ximin(t)] =
σximin(t)
ω − α
[
1 +
ω −
∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)πl(t)
ω − α
] ∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)πl(t)−
∑
l∈C−CǫU (t)
xl(t)πimin(t)

>
σximin(t)
ω − α
ǫU
N
.
It then follows that
πimin(t+ 1)− πimin(t) =
µimin
Nximin(t+ 1)
−
µimin
Nximin(t)
=
1
N
[
µimin
ximin(t) + ∆ximin(t)
−
µimin
ximin(t)
]
>
µimin [−∆ximin(t)]
N [ximin(t)]2
>
µiminσǫU
(ω − α)N2ximin(t)
>
µiminσǫU
N2
.
Given that πi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ C and let µmin , mini∈C µi, it holds that after at most O( N
2
µminσǫU
) iterations,
DISAP converges to an imitation-stable equilibrium where πimax − πimin ≤ ǫU .
It then can be shown in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3 that the imitation-stable equilibrium
is an ǫ-Nash of G with ǫ = 2ǫU .
Proof of theorem 6:
We prove the statement for t = 2. The case for t ≥ 3 is analogous to [5], which can be shown by
induction and is therefore omitted.
Define the random variable wji (c) such that
wji (c) =

1 if SU c is on channel j at iteration t = 1
and migrates to channel i at t = 2
0 otherwise
.
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Proportional imitation: If j 6= sc(1), it holds that wji (c) = 0, otherwise, c imitates a SU that was using
channel k at t = 0 and currently (t = 1) on the same channel as c (sc(1)) with probability
nk
sc(1)
nsc(1)
and
migrates to channel i with probability F isc(0),k. Note that we allow for self-imitation in our algorithm. We
thus have:
P[wji (c) = 1] =

0 if j 6= sc(1)∑
k∈C
nksc(1)
nsc(1)
F isc(0),k otherwise
.
We can now derive the population proportions at iteration t = 2 as:
pji (2) =
1
N
∑
c∈N
wji (c) ∀i, j ∈ C.
The expectations of these proportions can now be written as (using the Kronecker delta δi,j):
E[pji (2)] =
1
N
∑
c∈N
P[wji (c) = 1] =
1
N
∑
c∈N ,k∈C
nksc(1)(1)F
i
sc(0),k
δj,sc(1)
nsc(1)(1)
=
1
N
∑
h,l,k∈C
nlh(1)n
k
h(1)F
i
l,kδj,h
nh(1)
=
1
N
∑
l,k∈C
nlj(1)n
k
j (1)F
i
l,k
nj(1)
=
∑
l,k∈C
x˜lj(1)x˜
k
j (1)
x˜j(1)
F il,k.
It follows that
E[pi(2)] =
∑
j∈C
E[pji (2)] =
∑
j,l,k∈C
x˜lj(1)x˜
k
j (1)
x˜j(1)
F il,k.
As wji (c) and w
j
i (d) are independent random variables for c 6= d and since the variance of w
j
i (c) is less
than 1, the variance of pji (2) and pi(2) for any i, j ∈ C are less than 1/N and C/N , respectively. It then
follows the Bienayme´-Chebychev inequality that
∀i ∈ C,P[{|pi(2)− E[pi(2)]| > δ}] <
C
(Nδ)2
.
Choosing N0 such that C(N0δ)2 < ǫ concludes the proof for t = 2. The proof can then be induced to any
t as in [5].
Double imitation: If j 6= sc(1), it holds that wji (c) = 0, otherwise, c imitates two SUs that were using
respectively channel k and channel z at t = 0 and currently (t = 1) on the same channel as c (sc(1)) with
probability n
k
sc(1)
Nsc(1)
nz
sc(1)
nsc(1)
and migrates to channel i with probability F isc(0),{k,z}.
The proof follows in the steps of the proportional imitation and only the main passages will be sketched
out. We get:
P[wji (c) = 1] =

0 if j 6= sc(1)∑
k,z∈C
nksc(1)
nsc(1)
nzsc(1)
nsc(1)
F isc(0),{k,z} otherwise
.
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We then derive the type proportions expectations:
E[pji (2)] =
1
N
∑
c∈N
P[wji (c) = 1] =
1
N
∑
c∈N ,k,z∈C
nksc(1)(1)
nsc(1)(1)
nzsc(1)(1)
nsc(1)(1)
F isc(0),{k,z}δj,sc(1)
=
∑
l,k,z∈C
x˜lj(1)x˜
k
j (1)x˜
z
j (1)
[x˜j(1)]2
F il,{k,z}.
It follows that:
E[pi(2)] =
∑
j∈C
E[pji (2)] =
∑
j,l,k,z∈C
x˜lj(1)x˜
k
j (1)x˜
z
j(1)
[x˜j(1)]2
F il,{k,z}.
The rest of the proof for the double imitation follows the same way as that of proportional imitation.
Proof of theorem 8:
We prove the convergence of (9) by showing that the mapping described by (9) is a contraction. A
contraction mapping is defined [28] as follows: let (X, d) be a metric space, f : X → X is a contraction
if there exists a constant k ∈ [0, 1) such that ∀x, y ∈ X , d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ kd(x, y), where d(x, y) =
||x− y|| = maxi |xi− yi|. Such an f is called a contraction and admits a unique fixed point, to which the
mapping described by f converges.
Noticing that
d(f(x), f(y)) = ||f(x)− f(y)|| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ · ||x− y|| = ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ d(x, y),
it suffices to show that the Jacobian
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∂f∂x
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k. In our case, it suffices to show that ||J ||∞ ≤ k,
where J = {Jij} is the Jacobian of the mapping described by one of the equation in (9), defined by
Jij =
∂xi(t+ 1)
∂xj(t)
.
Recall that πi = µiNxi and π¯ =
∑
l
µl
N
, (9) can be rewritten as
xi(u) = xi(u− 1) + σ
[
µi
N
− xi(u− 1)
∑
l
µl
N
]
.
It follows that
Jij =

1−
∑
l
µl
N
j = i
0 otherwise
.
Hence
||J ||∞ = max
i∈N
∑
j∈N
|Jij| = 1−
∑
l
µl
N
< 1,
which shows that the mapping described by (9) is a contraction. It is further easy to check that the fixed
point of (9) is {x∗ = µi∑
l∈N µl
}, which is also the unique NE of G.
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Algorithm 1 PISAP: executed at each SU j
1: Initialization: set the imitation factor σ and the imitation threshold ǫU
2: For the first iteration t = 1, randomly choose a channel to stay
3: while at each iteration t ≥ 2 do
4: Randomly select a SU j′
5: if Uj < Uj′ − ǫU then
6: Migrate to the channel sj′ with probability p = σ(Uj′ − Uj)
7: end if
8: end while
Algorithm 2 DISAP: executed at each SU j for each iteration
1: Initialization: set the two exogenous parameters ω and α such that the payoff of SUs falls into the
interval [α, ω], set the imitation factor σ and the imitation threshold ǫU
2: Randomly sample two SUs j1 and j2 who, at iteration t− 1, were respectively on channel i1 and i2
3: if i1 = i2 then
4:
pj1 =
σ
2
[Q(Uj1)(Uj1 − Uj) +Q(Uj2)(Uj2 − Uj)]
+
where [A]+ denotes max{0, A} and
Q(Ur) ,
1
ω−α
[
2− Ur−α
ω−α
]
pj2 = 0
5: else if i1 = i then
6: pj1 = 0
pj2 =
σ
4
[Q(Uj1)(Uj2 − Uj1) +Q(Uj)(Uj2 − Uj1)]
+
7: else
8: pj1 =
σ
2
[Q(Uj)(Uj1 − Uj2) +Q(Uj2)(Uj1 − Uj)]
+
pj2 =
σ
2
[Q(Uj1)(Uj2 − Uj) +Q(Uj2)(Uj1 − Uj)]
+ − pj1
9: end if
10: Switch to channel i1 with probability pj1 if Uj < Uj1 − ǫU , switch to channel i2 with probability pj2
if Uj < Uj2 − ǫU
Algorithm 3 Imitation-based Spectrum Access Policy under Channel Constraint: executed at each SU j
1: Initialization: set the imitation factor σ and the imitation threshold ǫU
2: Randomly choose a channel for the first two iterations t = 0, 1
3: while for each iteration t ≥ 2 do
4: Perform imitation in PISAP or DISAP on the same channel
5: t← t + 1:
6: end while
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Fig. 1. Replicators and aggregate monotone dynamics generate a similar phase plane. This is the case of a 2-strategies game with N = 50
SUs and µ = [0.3 0.8]. As investigated in Section III and Section II, the system has a unique NE, to which all trajectories (solid lines)
converge exponentially
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Fig. 2. PISAP dynamic and its approximation by double replicator
dynamic.
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Fig. 3. DISAP dynamic and its approximation by double aggregate
monotone dynamic.
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Fig. 4. PISAP dynamic with channel constraint and replicator
dynamic without channel constraint
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Fig. 5. DISAP dynamic with channel constraint and aggregate
monotone dynamic without channel constraint
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Fig. 6. DISAP dynamic compared to PISAP dynamic with channel constraint.
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Fig. 7. PISAP: number of SUs per channel as a function of time
without channel constraint
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Fig. 8. DISAP: number of SUs per channel as a function of time
without channel constraint
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Fig. 9. PISAP: focus on the convergence phase without channel
constraint
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Fig. 10. DISAP: focus on the convergence phase without channel
constraint
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Fig. 11. PISAP: number of SUs per channel as a function of time
with channel constraint
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Fig. 12. DISAP: number of SUs per channel as a function of time
with channel constraint
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Fig. 13. Jain’s fairness index of the system with channel constraint as a function of time
